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Introduction
Cybersecurity  threats,  such  as  Internet  worms 
(tinyurl.com/lg2wghw), can spread too quickly for humans 
to  respond  and  pose  a  genuine  risk  to  users  and  sys-
tems. In March 2013, a computer scam fooled some Ca-
nadian Internet users by picking up their location and 
making it appear as though the Royal Canadian Moun-
ted Police had frozen their screens; pop-ups demanded 
that users must pay a $100 fine to have their computer 
unlocked  (CBC,  2013;  tinyurl.com/lhuwq82).  In  the  same 
month, a computer virus paralyzed computer networks 
of broadcasters and banks in a network attack in South 
Korea (BBC, 2013; tinyurl.com/cgustwk). The economic and 
national security consequences of these types of attacks 
are severe. The official website of the United States De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS; tinyurl.com/kttv9qo) 
indicates  that  the  Secret  Services  Cyber  Intelligence 
Section has directly contributed to the arrest of transna-
tional  cybercriminals  who  were  responsible  for  the 
theft  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  credit  card  numbers 
and the loss of approximately $600 million to financial 
and  retail  institutions.  The  same  resource  indicates 
that, in 2011, the DHS prevented $1.5 billion in poten-
tial  losses  through  cybercrime  investigations.  The  dis-
tributed  architecture  of  networks  results  not  only  in 
faster propagation of cyberattacks, but it also affects a 
greater  number  of  vulnerable  cyberdevices.  For  ex-
ample, in 2003, the Slammer worm infected more than 
90%  of  vulnerable  hosts  in  10  minutes  (Moore  et  al., 
2003; tinyurl.com/koweuj5). Traditional security models are 
not  able  to  keep  up  with  the  security  attacks  that 
propagate at machine speed.
McConnell (2011; tinyurl.com/65udd87) explored the tech-
nical  options  to  enhance  cybersecurity  through  three 
major  building  blocks:  automation,  interoperability, 
and authentication. These building blocks provide the 
means to limit the spread of attacks and thus minimize 
consequences.  McConnell  introduced  the  concept  of 
automated  courses  of  action  (ACOA),  which  encapsu-
lates many of the complex decisions and activities in-
Security is a critical concern in today's software systems. Besides the interconnectivity and 
dynamic nature of network systems, the increasing complexity in modern software sys-
tems amplifies the complexity of IT security. This fact leaves attackers one step ahead in 
exploiting vulnerabilities and introducing new cyberattacks. The demand for new method-
ologies in addressing cybersecurity is emphasized by both private and national corpora-
tions.  A  practical  solution  to  dynamically  manage  the  high  complexity  of  IT  security  is 
adaptive security, which facilitates analysis of the system's behaviour and hence the pre-
vention of malicious attacks in complex systems. Systems that feature adaptive security de-
tect and mitigate security threats at runtime with little or no administrator involvement. In 
these systems, decisions at runtime are balanced according to quality and performance 
goals. This article describes the necessity of holistic decision making in such systems and 
paves the road to future research.
When you have to make a choice and don't make it, 
that is in itself a choice.
William James (1842–1910)
Philosopher and psychologist
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volved  in  defending  cybersystems.  The  concept  of 
ACOAs is a novel step toward enabling the collective ac-
tion  required  to  protect  against  evolving  cyberthreats. 
Novel decision-making approaches will enhance these 
courses of actions in response to cybersituations.
Automation accelerates the analysis of monitored data 
and  perhaps  increases  the  number  of  symptoms  that 
can be detected in order to prevent a threat. Moreover, 
automation helps to speed up the decision-making pro-
cess at the time of attack. An immediate, suboptimal re-
sponse  can  sometimes  be  more  effective  than  a  later, 
optimal  response.  These  timely  actions  prevent  the 
spread  of  attack  and  therefore  minimize  the  con-
sequences  of  the  attack.  In  recent  years,  interest  in 
building software systems that are adaptive to their se-
curity goals has increased. Self-adaptive software (SAS) 
systems address automation in response to changes in 
the requirement and environment. SAS monitors itself 
and its context, detects significant changes, decides how 
to  react,  and  executes  such  decisions  (Salehie  and 
Tahvildari,  2009;  tinyurl.com/lffu25g).  Adaptive  security 
refers to solutions that aim to adapt their defence mech-
anisms at runtime. This class of SAS is called self-pro-
tecting software (SPS). SPS systems have the ability to 
detect  security  attacks  and  trigger  countermeasures. 
These systems not only defend against the malicious at-
tack but also are capable of anticipating problems and 
taking  steps  to  avoid  them  or  moderate  their  effects 
(Salehie and Tahvildari, 2009;  tinyurl.com/lffu25g). In this 
article, we focus on the role of automation in cyberse-
curity.  First,  we  raise  awareness  of  the  importance  of 
addressing adaptive security from a holistic view of the 
system. Second, we show how game theory can contrib-
ute to decision making in adaptive security. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next 
section provides an overview of the active work on self-
protecting systems. Then, we highlight the importance 
of creating a holistic decision-making strategy in cyber-
security, after which we discuss the use of game theory 
in  the  network  and  application  architecture  layers  of 
the system. Finally, we conclude by describing the steps 
required to achieve a holistic decision-making strategy.
SPS Tools and Techniques
Projects in both academia and industry have addressed 
adaptivity in software systems. Table 1 lists recent re-
search and development achievements in self-protect-
ing software systems.
A revealing insight from this overview of tools and tech-
niques  is  the  absence  of  adaptation  decision-making 
that captures all the possible knowledge from the soft-
ware system and incorporates that knowledge in mak-
ing effective adaptive decisions. In both academia and 
industry, SPS is still in its early years.
Holistic Decision Making in Adaptive Security
The fundamental relationship between security and de-
cision making is highlighted by Alpcan and Başar (2010; 
tinyurl.com/mfvae39).  Making  systematic  decisions,  such 
as allocating resources while balancing risks, can bene-
fit  the  system  with  efficient  protection  against  both 
known  and  unknown  attacks.  The  dynamic  nature  of 
network  security  requires  dynamic  analysis  and  de-
cision making based on the monitored data. Dynamic 
measurements of the system metrics and states mani-
fest dynamic changes both in the system itself and in 
the environment.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of acquiring data from 
different  layers  of  the  software’s  architecture  through 
sensors.  The  adaptable  software  may  contain  one  or 
more layers than are shown in this figure. Here, the rest 
of the layers that are not included in the software itself 
are considered as the environment. A holistic decision-
making strategy considers knowledge from different lay-
ers  of  the  system  in  its  decision-making  process.  The 
monitored data is gathered from the sensors of the sys-
tem itself and its environment. Depending on the sys-
tem,  some  layers  may  not  provide  access  for  the 
sensors or effectors in that layer. The data gathered by 
sensors is transmitted through event buses to the adapt-
ation manager, which contains the four main adapta-
tion  processes:  monitor,  analyze,  plan,  and  execute. 
The  planning  process  encapsulates  the  decision-mak-
ing engine. The knowledge of the system itself and its 
environment  is  shared  among  the  adaptation  pro-
cesses.  Correspondingly,  adaptation  action  is  applied 
through effectors in various layers of the software sys-
tem. The decision-making technique must embody the 
gathered knowledge from various sources and find the 
effective alternate action in the most appropriate layer 
of the software system. The set of adaptive security ac-
tions can be applied in more than one layer of the soft-
ware  system.  The  effectors  that  are  responsible  for 
performing  adaptation  actions  reside  in  the  layers  of 
the system itself and its environment based on the ac-
cess permission to different architecture layers.Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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The need for holistic management in disciplines such 
as management science is explored through enterprise 
integration  (Dalal  et  al.,  2004;  tinyurl.com/kkwvapu).  Be-
sides,  vulnerability  and  risk  management  can  benefit 
from a holistic methodology by assessing the non-lin-
ear relations of contextual parameters and the complex-
ity  and  dynamics  of  social  systems  (Cardona,  2003; 
tinyurl.com/l3m6zdl). Recently, the idea of delivering a hol-
istic approach to addressing cybersecurity has received 
greater  attention.  Bencomo,  Belaggoun,  and  Issarny 
(2013; tinyurl.com/kr6sc56) provide a holistic view to tackle 
self-adaptation under uncertainty. They use the math-
ematical model of dynamic decision networks (DDNs) 
to support decision making under uncertainty for self-
adaptation. An architecture-based approach in SPS sys-
tems  was  recently  proposed  by  Yuan  and  colleagues 
(2013;  tinyurl.com/n6ydvn7); their approach benefits from 
the holistic view of the systems that is provided by the 
software architecture.
A holistic view of the application and its environment 
can  be  completed  through  feedback  loops.  Feedback 
loops help to combine the result of adaptation with the-
oretical formulation of the problem. Developing a de-
cision  solely  based  on  the  mathematical  model  does 
not  reflect  the  actual  consequences  of  the  decisions 
made.  Incorporating  a  feedback  loop  in  the  decision-
making engine helps to repeatedly observe the result of 
the  actions  made  and  consider  its  effectiveness  in  fu-
ture alternative actions.
In  summary,  to  achieve  a  holistic  decision  making 
strategy: i) security goals must be defined at each archi-
tecture  layer  of  the  system;  ii)  appropriate  decision-
making models and techniques should be applied to re-
duce conflicts and increase the decision quality; and iii) 
adaptation should not be limited to detecting and pre-
venting attacks – adaptation must also stop the spread 
of the attack after it happens.
From game theory to adaptive security
A variety of mathematical theories can be used to mod-
el and analyze cybersecurity. Resource-allocation prob-
lems  in  network  security  can  be  formulated  as 
optimization  problems  (Alpcan  and  Başar,  2010; 
tinyurl.com/mfvae39). In dynamic systems, control theory is 
beneficial in formulating the dynamic behaviour of the 
systems. In contrast, game theory provides rich math-
ematical tools and techniques to express security prob-
lems.  Security  games  allow  players  (the  defender  and 
the attacker) to develop a systematic strategy based on 
formalized methods. In security games, players do not 
have access to each other’s payoffs; therefore, they ob-
serve the opponent’s behaviour and estimate the result 
of their action. Security games can be modelled as non-
cooperative games in which players make decisions in-
dependently.
Due to limited resources in software systems, a practic-
al approach is to utilize the resources and protect them 
against malicious attacks. Critical assets such as person-
Figure 1. Decision making based on holistic shared knowledge of system layersTechnology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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al  or  sensitive  information  also  require  protection. 
Game theory provides a formal approach to maximize 
the  effectiveness  of  resources  against  cyberthreats 
(Tambe, 2011; tinyurl.com/m6nwedq). From simple determ-
inistic games to more complex stochastic games, security 
games can be used to model security in intrusion-detec-
tion  systems  and  social,  wireless,  and  vehicular  net-
works (Alpcan and Başar, 2010; tinyurl.com/mfvae39).
The  analytical  foundation  of  game  theory  can  be  ap-
plied to security problems at various architecture layers 
of the system. For example, intrusion detection is a de-
fence mechanism at the network layer. Intrusion-detec-
tion  systems  can  take  adaptive  actions  such  as 
intensifying  monitoring  efforts  when  malicious  beha-
viour is detected. In the remainder of this section, we 
look at the applicability of game theory in two architec-
ture levels: the network layer and the application layer.
Security games at the network level
Network security is a strategic game between the mali-
cious attacker and the administrator (Alpcan and Başar, 
2010; tinyurl.com/mfvae39). In a simple intrusion-detection 
game, the attacker chooses between the alternative ac-
tions of attacking or non-attacking. Due to limited re-
sources by the systems and the fact that monitoring and 
analyzing the monitored data adds overhead to the sys-
tem, the system has the option to continue the default 
monitoring or to intensify monitoring. This simple for-
mulation  can  be  extended  in  complex  cases  such  as 
stochastic  games  or  games  with  limited  information, 
which  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  by  Alpcan  and 
Başar (2010;  tinyurl.com/mfvae39). After distinguishing the 
alternative actions by each player, the next step is to as-
sociate the payoff for each action. Based on the decision 
strategy, players select the alternative that yields a bet-
ter  payoff.  Similar  modelling  can  be  applied  to  intru-
sion-prevention  systems  and  efforts  to  prevent 
denial-of-service attacks. In the latter case, the alternat-
ive actions of the attacker could be changing the rate of 
data  generation  in  the  network.  Meanwhile,  the  sys-
tem’s alternative actions are: i) checking the rate of con-
gestion  and  ii)  modifying  the  refresh  interval.  After 
identifying  the  main  components  of  the  game  theory 
(i.e., players, the set of alternative actions, and the pay-
offs), the more appropriate type of game can be selec-
ted  based  on  the  availability  of  data.  For  example,  if 
complete  knowledge  of  the  adversary  payoffs  is  avail-
able,  repeated  complete-information  games  can  be  ex-
ploited in modelling.
Security games at the application level
Existing cybersecurity approaches based on game the-
ory are mostly focused on providing security at the net-
work  level.  The  mathematical  foundation  of  game 
theory can also be applicable to security at a variety of 
architecture  levels  such  as  the  database  or  operating 
system. Here, we discuss the applicability of game the-
ory  in  providing  security  at  the  application  level.  De-
pending  on  the  architecture  layer,  the  source  of  the 
data to be monitored is different. To detect a cyberat-
tack at the network level, the data to be monitored can 
be packet data, network traffic, etc. At the application 
level, a cyberattack can be detected from various data 
sources. For example, the system can monitor the num-
ber  of  transactions  by  a  specific  user  or  the  access 
rights  of  a  user  over  a  specific  window  of  time.  Even 
though the nature of the monitored data may vary, the 
problem  can  still  be  modelled  as  a  non-cooperative 
game. The alternative set of actions includes more high-
level  actions  that  should  align  with  the  system’s  spe-
cified policies. As an example, the dynamic change to 
the  access  rights  of  a  user  should  satisfy  the  pre  and 
post conditions specified in the IT policy.
Previous approaches, such as those used by Alpcan and 
Başar (2010; tinyurl.com/mfvae39), only apply game theory 
at  one  layer  of  the  system.  To  provide  a  holistic  ap-
proach in making decisions at runtime using game the-
ory, defining the set of alternative actions that can be 
taken by both players should not be limited to actions 
in only one layer of the systems. The same requirement 
applies to the data gathered by sensors in various archi-
tecture layers.
Conclusion
This article presents a brief overview on adaptive secur-
ity and existing tools and techniques for SPS, and it in-
troduces  a  visionary  approach  in  holistic  decision 
making  to  achieve  adaptivity  in  cybersecurity.  It 
provides insights into the use of game theory as a de-
cision-making strategy that can be applied in different 
architecture  levels.  A  proper  decision-making  strategy 
not  only  helps  to  model  security  goals  and  actions  at 
runtime, but it also enables systematic decision making 
after the attack happens and it consequently limits the 
spread of attack in distributed systems.Technology Innovation Management Review August 2013
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